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ABSTRACT
In this article, I discuss policy implications based on a study of the capital struc-
ture of business start-ups. Using a sample of 328 newly founded enterprises in
Belgian manufacturing, it turned out that venture capital is barely used as a source
of financing at the time of start-up. Also, banks finance a lower fraction of debt
for firms that face potentially large adverse selection and moral hazard problems.
To remedy their shortage of bank credit, start-up firms use leasing and vendor
financing, but have lower leverage. These results therefore suggest that newly
founded enterprises may face significant financial constraints at start-up, which
could contribute to their subsequent failure. As a result, I plead for policy mea-
sures that stimulate venture capital financing for smaller scale and non-high tech
projects and that encourage information production by banks. While having their
own merits, current government measures towards start-ups, which largely con-
sist of providing and guaranteeing loans, do not actually meet these requirements.
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Entrepreneurs seeking external funds to finance their venture might
exhibit large adverse selection and moral hazard problems at the time
of start-up. First, potential investors have no or only limited prior
information on the entrepreneur or the project that can assist them to
evaluate the venture’s quality. This is especially the case for first-time
entrepreneurs,  who  were  examined  in  this  study.  It  is  true  that
financiers may have access to information on earlier start-ups, which
is useful to estimate average new venture quality within a pool of simi-
lar projects, but it remains difficult to assess an individual venture’s
quality. The relatively high failure rate of newly founded enterprises
is consistent with this argument. Holmes and Smithz (1995), for
instance, document that 46% of start-ups discontinue operations within
four years. Similarly, Dun & Bradstreet (1994) find that in 1993,
approximately 50% of all firms that failed did so in the first five years
of their existence. Given the high failure risk of start-ups, financiers
worry about the problems induced by asymmetric information. Speci-
fically, adverse selection problems result when entrepreneurs of high
quality ventures find the average price of external funds too high and
therefore withdraw from the capital market (e.g., Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981)). Indeed, when start-ups are observationally indistinguishable,
they are pooled and a lemons premium is charged to all firms in the
pool to compensate investors for the pool’s average risk. Hence, high
quality start-ups are undervalued, which could induce these firms to
reduce their demand for funds. Overall, financiers are likely to worry
about adverse selection problems in industries where the failure rate
of prior start-ups is high.
Second, financiers may have difficulty in inducing entrepreneurs to
comply with contractual agreements once financial contracts are es-
tablished. Entrepreneurs, as a result, may expend insufficient effort,
exhibit expense preference behavior or invest suboptimally once finan-
cial contracts are established. Diamond (1991) argues that such moral
hazard problems are smaller for firms that have built up a reputation.
First-time start-ups clearly have no reputation at stake. Also, given
that there is no separation of ownership and control, entrepreneurs
have large discretion in deciding on which projects to start and these
projects may not be in the best interest of external financiers. More
specifically, Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977) argue that
highly leveraged firms, which start-ups typically are, may engage in
24risk shifting and underinvestment. These incentive problems are highly
detrimental  to  creditors,  who  are  only  entitled  to  fixed  payment
streams.
On the one hand, risk shifting incentives are especially prevalent for
highly leveraged firms that are heading towards financial distress.
Entrepreneurs usually have invested substantial financial and human
capital in their firm and they typically attribute a large value to pri-
vate benefits of control (Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994a); Hamilton (2000)).
These features of entrepreneurial firms therefore will enlarge risk shifting
problems during the state of financial distress; by reorienting the
firm’s assets and operations towards more risky ones, entrepreneurs
may attempt to avoid bankruptcy and, thus, the loss of control rents
and invested capital. Since the payoff to equity holders is convex in
the firm’s cash flow generation, risky projects are likely to increase the
entrepreneur’s utility at the expense of creditors. Indeed, creditors do
not participate in the gains from excessive risk taking while bearing
a large share of the losses. In general, creditors are likely to worry
about risk shifting incentives when the firm’s ex ante failure risk is
high and firm assets on hand can be divested rather easily.
On the other hand, underinvestment incentives are particularly re-
levant for firms with a debt overhang. Since future investment oppor-
tunities can be considered as options that can be exercised at the
discretion of the entrepreneur, entrepreneurs of highly leveraged firms
may prefer to not (yet) exercise these options. As a result, these
options may expire worthlessly. Particularly projects whose benefits
mainly accrue to existing debtholders are likely to be forgone, even
when they have a positive net present value. For start-up firms, where
a significant part of total firm value consists of future growth oppor-
tunities, creditors are likely to be concerned about underinvestment
incentives. More specifically, the more important the firm’s growth
opportunities at start-up, the more creditors will worry about under-
investment incentives.
From this discussion, it is clear that information production before
the financial contract is established and monitoring ex post are highly
valuable for business start-ups. In particular, these activities can
help to reduce information and incentive problems. While screening
cannot reduce the inherent failure risk of start-up firms, it can reduce
the likelihood that low quality ventures obtain financing. Conversely,
monitoring allows to more directly adjust entrepreneurial decisions
towards  actions  that  increase  total  firm  value,  thereby  reducing
25the likelihood of default. Screening and monitoring, therefore, are
likely to have a favorable impact upon the availability and price of
external funds at start-up and thereafter. In Sections II and III, the
literature on ex ante screening and ex post monitoring by venture
capitalists, respectively banks is reviewed. While trade credit is an
important source of financing for start-ups in practice, suppliers are
unlikely to screen and monitor borrowers.1 Section IV then describes
the actual role of venture capitalists and banks in financing the start-
up stage of newly established ventures in traditional manufacturing
industries. This discussion is based on a study of the initial financial
structure of traditional business start-ups. Section V discusses the po-
licy implications of these findings. I start by making some sugges-
tions for constructive government measures and end by evaluating
existing government measures in this context. Section VI concludes
this paper.
II. VENTURE CAPITAL
Venture capital is a form of intermediated, private equity. Venture capi-
talists accept funds from other investors, which they reinvest in high
risk firms with a high growth potential, often in high technology indus-
tries. Also, being equity finance, the payoff structure of the contract
closely follows the firm’s performance, through dividend payments
and capital gains that are accumulated over time. This feature is valu-
able whenever initial cash flows are highly uncertain or even negative
in the years following start-up and when the venture itself needs
continued investment. In contrast, creditors receive periodic fixed
interest payments, independent of the firm’s results. Some theoretical
contributions to the literature have argued that this feature of debt con-
tracts is valuable since it may prevent low quality entrepreneurs
(lemons) from raising funds or it may induce firms to pay out cash
(e.g., Narayanan (1988)). In these models, the loss in diversification
benefits from contracting debt is more than compensated by the lower
price of external finance for high quality entrepreneurs. Conversely,
lemons – unless they wish to mimic high quality ventures – are likely
to prefer equity over debt. The reason is that low quality entrepre-
neurs anticipate that investors who provided equity financing will find
it difficult to liquidate their firm after having learned its quality.
Adverse selection problems, therefore, could be potentially large for
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liquidation once it defaults on its debt obligations as control is turned
to them following default. Similarly, the potential for moral hazard
problems is large with venture capital, especially in firms where the
venture capitalist holds an important equity stake (agency problem of
equity).
Nevertheless, the literature argues that venture capital is an appro-
priate source of financing for newly founded enterprises. The reason
is that venture capitalists have developed their own mechanisms to
reduce information and incentive problems. First, venture capitalists
spend considerable effort in evaluating prospective clients and they
often specialize in particular industries in which they develop exper-
tise. By screening out the low quality ventures, the lemons premium
for high quality ventures is reduced and the adverse selection problem
is limited. It is widely known that on average less than 10% of appeals
for funds get approved, which supports extensive screening by ven-
ture capitalists.2
Second, venture capitalists stage financing contracts so as to reduce
both adverse selection and moral hazard problems. By providing only
limited funding in the initial financing stage, the incentives of entre-
preneurs with low quality projects to apply for financing are reduced
whereas the incentives of entrepreneurs to comply with contractual
agreements are increased. The reason is that staging gives venture capi-
talists the option to periodically abandon projects, which induces
entrepreneurs to behave in the best interests of their financiers. Such
an option is valuable when the accuracy of the venture capitalist’s
information improves over time, which likely is to be the case with
start-up firms. Also, the shorter the duration of an individual financing
round, the greater the need to periodically gather information on the
entrepreneur’s progress and compliance.
Third, venture capitalists often require an important position on the
firm’s board, which allows them to monitor the venture extensively,
but also gives them a voice in strategic decisions. As a result, they can
influence the firm’s investment program towards projects that solely
increase firm value. The network to which venture capitalists have
access to can, for instance, be used to assist firms in forming value
increasing strategic alliances. Simultaneously, through their board
representation, venture capitalists can influence the structuring of
entrepreneurial compensation schemes to align the entrepreneur’s and
the venture capitalist’s interests. Compensation contracts typically
27combine a base salary and an equity stake to partially reduce the entre-
preneur’s risk while guaranteeing incentive compatibility, but the pre-
cise form of the contract can be (re)negotiated.
Finally, venture capitalists also determine the time and form of exit
from their portfolio investments. As the ultimate goal of venture capi-
talists is to divest their equity stake, exit could be a way for entre-
preneurs to regain control. Black and Gilson (1998) argue that an
IPO, a frequently used exit mechanism, provides entrepreneurs with
an incentive to perform as only successful firms are taken public.
Then, distribution rules can be determined such that initial owners de
facto regain control (see also Brennan and Franks (1997)).3As a result,
the incentives of entrepreneurs and venture capitalists are aligned.
So, when financed with venture capital, entrepreneurs have to par-
tially give up control in the short run but, provided that their venture
is  successful,  they  can  reacquire  control  over  a  longer  horizon.
The reputation that venture capitalists have at stake ensures that they
will honor these implicit contracts on control with entrepreneurs.
Lin and Smith (1995), for instance, find that only 12% of lead ven-
ture capitalists retain 5% or more of their portfolio companies’shares
within three years after the IPO.
III. BANK FINANCING
In Belgium, banks can only partially substitute for venture capitalists.
First, the shareholdings of banks in non-financial firms are subject to
strict regulation. Belgian banks, for instance, cannot hold equity in
non-financial firms unless these investments are used to cover dubi-
ous or unpaid claims. In the latter cases, shareholdings can only be
maintained during a period of maximum two years (KB 185, art. 14).
Nevertheless,  this  obstacle  could  be  solved  by  means  of  captive
financing subsidiaries that indirectly invest equity in business start-
ups. However, even in countries where banks can directly hold equity,
such as in Japan or Germany, newly established firms are not highly
funded by banks either (e.g., Edwards and Fischer (1993)). This finding
suggests that other factors than legal prohibitions on equity invest-
ments are at work.
Second, liability considerations also restrain banks from performing
the role of an active investor and, thus, becoming highly involved
in a firm’s operations, for instance by assuming a seat on its board.
28For the U.S., Kroszner and Strahan (1999) find that commercial banks
are only represented on the boards of large, stable firms that have high
proportions of tangible assets and low reliance on short-term debt
financing. Whereas the costs of active involvement in these firms’
management in terms of lender liability are likely to be small, even
the banks that join a board rarely are the firm’s main bank lender.
Similarly, Carey et al. (1999) find that banks finance a lower fraction
of debt in firms that can be detected easily as being of high risk, which
they partly attribute to liability considerations.
Even though bank financing, as a form of debt, is less flexible than
equity, banks may still play a valuable function in financing start-ups
when venture capital is lacking, provided that they screen and monitor
their borrowers. Smith and Warner (1979), for instance, argue that
banks can include restrictive covenants in their debt contracts, re-
quiring the borrower to return to its bank when the financial condition
of the firm deteriorates or when strategic opportunities to enhance value
arise. At that time, banks have to decide whether or not they will finan-
cially back firm decisions. The literature on established, listed firms
argues that banks indeed produce information and monitor firms
extensively. The positive announcement effects when banks extend or
renew loans to publicly quoted firms are consistent with this argu-
ment (e.g., James (1987)). Furthermore, these announcement effects
are larger for firms that exhibit large information asymmetries, such
as younger and smaller firms (e.g., Slovin et al. (1992)).
In the financial intermediation literature, it is stressed that because
of their centralized information production, specialization and reputa-
tional capital, banks have an advantage in collecting information and
monitoring the activities of their borrowers. Intermediated bank debt
prevents that many investors need to collect the same information and
thus allows to save on monitoring costs. Simultaneously, information
production  engenders  important  scale  economies,  which  can  be
exploited maximally when one party collects the needed information.
Also, the information that the bank acquires as part of the ongoing
deposit relationship with its borrowers may increase the precision of
its information and may provide it with a comparative cost advantage
in monitoring (e.g., Fama (1985); Nakamura (1993)). Through moni-
toring transactions accounts, banks can observe the size and timing of
orders, the ability of firms to take advantage of early payment dis-
counts, etc. Finally, asymmetric information problems can be solved
without making public proprietary information that could harm the
29firm’s competitive position. Bhattacharya and Chiesa (1995) argue
that firms may reveal firm specific information more readily to a small
group of lenders, such as the firm’s bank, than to a diffuse group of
lenders.
IV. INITIAL FINANCIAL STRUCTURE OF 
BUSINESS START-UPS
A. Sample Description
The sample consisted of 328 Belgian entrepreneurial start-ups in the
manufacturing industry, all started up in 1992. In Belgium, each firm
receives a unique and chronologically accorded Value Added Tax num-
ber the first time it registers with the tax authorities. Using this VAT
number, all newly established firms in 1992 could be identified.
The sample was restricted to start-up firms in a single year to control
for aspects that are unrelated to information and incentive problems.
Simultaneously, the sample was restricted to manufacturing start-ups.
The larger (optimal) scale of operations for manufacturing firms when
compared to retailers, wholesalers or service firms made it likely that
the personal funds of the entrepreneur were insufficient to fully finance
all assets and operations at start-up. In addition, all firms in the sam-
ple are incorporated, which required them to file their financial state-
ments as of start-up with the Belgian National Bank and to publish an
abstract of their foundation charter in the National Newspaper (Staats-
blad). These selection criteria resulted in a sample of 652 firms, re-
porting their NACE-code at the four-digit level.
This sample was subsequently cleaned to remove all firms that were
not true entrepreneurial business start-ups. Using the foundation char-
ter, entrepreneurial start-ups could be distinguished from newly es-
tablished subsidiaries of existing firms, split-ups, spin-offs, etc. Firms
arising from the incorporation of a previously self-employed activity,
identified through follow-up phone calls, were also removed from the
sample. These screening criteria reduced the sample to 328 true busi-
ness start-ups. Table 1 describes the industry distribution of the sam-
ple firms, based on their two-digit NACE code. The firms are highly
represented in the paper, printing and publishing industry (98 firms);
the food, drink and tobacco industry (51 firms); and the timber and
wooden furniture industry (35 firms).
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These firms are rather small at the time of start-up: the average value
of total assets amounts to €244,174 whereas the average number of
employees is 2.82. The asset structure reveals that on average 39.29%
of total assets consist of fixed tangible assets, whereas inventories and
highly liquid assets (cash and marketable securities) represent 10.47%,
respectively 12.30% of total assets in the start-up year. Next, the start-
ups in the sample are highly levered: on average, 69.34% of funds is
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TABLE 1
Industry distribution of start-ups
NACE code Description Number 
of firms
2200-2299 Production and preliminary processing of metals 1 firm
2300-2399 Extraction of minerals other than metalliferous and 1 firm
energy producing minerals; peat extraction
2400-2499 Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products 7 firms
2500-2599 Chemical industry 5 firms
3100-3199 Manufacture of metal articles (except for mechanical, 16 firms
electrical and instrument engineering and vehicles) 16 firms
3200-3299 Mechanical engineering 8 firms
3400-3499 Electrical engineering 13 firms
3600-3699 Manufacture of other means of transport 4 firms
3700-3799 Instrument engineering 15 firms
4100-4299 Food, drink and tobacco industry 51 firms
4300-4399 Textile industry 20 firms
4400-4499 Leather and leather goods industry 4 firms
(except footwear and clothing)
4500-4599 Footwear and clothing industry 26 firms
4600-4699 Timber and wooden furniture industries 35 firms
4700-4799 Manufacture of paper and paper products; printing  98 firms
and publishing
4800-4899 Processing of rubber and plastics 6 firms
4900-4999 Other manufacturing industries 18 firms
Total 328 firms
The sample consists of 328 Belgian business start-ups in the manufacturing sector, founded
in the year 1992. All data relates to the start-up year and was obtained from the Belgian
National Bank (annual accounts), the abstract from the foundation charter (Staatsblad) and
a survey that was sent out.contracted as outside debt financing. Bank debt and trade credit are
equally important sources of funding, with each representing about
one third of total debt financing on average. Only 73 firms use leasing,
which represents 3.67% of total debt in the average firm. For firms that
lease at least some of their equipment (leasing > 0), it represents
16.36%  of  total  debt.  Given  that  trade  credit  is  very  short-term
financing, it is not surprising to observe that the maturity structure of
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TABLE 2
Descriptive statistics on the sample of start-ups in the year of start-up
N > 0 Mean Median Std. dev
FIRM SIZE
Total assets (€) 328 244,174 102,270 593,704
Number of employees 250 2.82 2 4.4947
ASSET STRUCTURE
Fixed tangible assets/total assets 314 0.3929 0.3896 0.2581
Inventories/total assets 218 0.1047 0.0466 0.1433
Cash and marketable securities/total assets 300 0.1230 0.0611 0.1665
FINANCIAL STRUCTURE
Leverage 325 0.6934 0.7804 0.2497
Bank debt/total debt 244 0.3360 0.3213 0.2962
Bank debt/total debt if bank debt > 0 244 0.4476 0.4469 0.2586
Trade credit/total debt 314 0.3289 0.2839 0.2695
Leasing/total debt 73 0.0367 0 0.1115
Leasing/total debt if bank debt > 0 73 0.1636 0.1004 0.1867
Short-term debt (one year/total debt 321 0.6563 0.6975 0.3000
Short-term bank debt (one year)/
total bank debt 120 0.2221 0 0.3402
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE
Number of shareholders 328 2.42 2 1.1561
Herfindahl index of ownership
concentration 328 0.6488 0.5008 0.2704
The sample consists of 328 Belgian business start-ups in the manufacturing sector founded
in the year 1992. All data relates to the start-up year and was obtained from the Belgian
National Bank (annual accounts), the abstract from the foundation charter (Staatsblad) and a
survey that was sent out. N>0represents the number of sample firms with a value greater
than zero for the corresponding variable, whereas Mean, Median and Std. dev represent the
average, median respectively standard deviation of the corresponding variable in the sample.debt is largely tilted towards short-term debt: 65.63% of total debt has
a maturity less than one year. When considering bank loans only, on
average 22.21% of bank debt is due within one year. Finally, owner-
ship information reveals that ownership is highly concentrated: in the
average start-up firm, 2.42 shareholders are involved whereas the
herfindahl index of ownership concentration amounts to 64.88%.
B. Empirical Results
In this section, I discuss three main findings on the capital structure
of the above described sample of start-ups, which have implications
for public policy as discussed in the following section. First, entre-
preneurial firms in traditional industries do not highly use venture capi-
tal as a source of financing at the time of start-up. In this sample of
start-ups, only four out of 328 firms used venture capital as an initial
financing source. Earlier research using U.S. data already pointed out
that venture capitalists are mainly specialized in funding high tech
companies, which might explain this finding. Also, the relatively small
start-up size of the studied firms makes them rather uninteresting to
venture capitalists. Another explanation could be that in Continental
Europe, venture capitalists typically concentrate on financing a firm’s
growth rather than start-up stage (e.g., Ooghe, Manigart and Fassin
(1991); Van Hulle (1998)).
Second, newly founded firms that face potentially large adverse
selection and moral hazard problems at start-up have a lower fraction
of debt that consists of bank loans, ceteris paribus. The results also
show that ex ante information and incentive problems are not signifi-
cantly related to the likelihood of obtaining a bank loan. In other words,
banks still provide funding when adverse selection and moral hazard
problems are potentially extensive, but they simply limit their exposure
through limiting the size of the granted loans. This conclusion is rein-
forced by the fact that no relation is observed between the maturity
structure of bank debt and the potential for adverse selection and moral
hazard problems. Conversely, when banks would have limited loan
maturity, the refinancing decision would have come earlier, thereby
giving a monitoring creditor greater ability to reverse early some invest-
ments that turn out bad decisions. Next, entrepreneurs who provide a
credible quality signal by investing more equity at start-up raise a larger
fraction of bank debt, but also limit the maturity of their bank loans.
A potential explanation, which is consistent with the earlier findings
33and conclusions, is that these entrepreneurs perceive that their bank
does not appropriately take their higher credit quality into account when
deciding on the price of the credit. Then, by limiting the maturity of
their bank loans at start-up, high quality entrepreneurs try to avoid
locking in their financing costs until more (favorable) information
about their firm becomes available. These conclusions conflict with
the screening and monitoring role that the literature has attributed to
banks in financing established, listed firms. Possibly, the complexity
and/or the costs that are associated with screening and monitoring busi-
ness start-ups are prohibitive, especially since the size of the loans gen-
erally is small (e.g., Ravid and Spiegel (1997)). Then, the unexpected
drain of the high quality firms from a given pool of start-ups or unan-
ticipated incentive problems can quickly turn a bank’s loan portfolio
into losses, especially since banks earn only small profit margins on
their loan transactions.4 Conversely, by financing a positive but limited
fraction of total debt, banks obtain a stake in start-up firms while their
risk is limited. The results also indicate that banks finance a larger frac-
tion of debt in firms with favorable growth prospects, which further
supports the argument that banks behave opportunistically.
However, the start-up firms in this sample do not have lower leverage
when  the  potential  for  adverse  selection  problems  is  relatively
high. It turned out that leasing and trade credit are used to remedy a
shortage of bank funds, whereby leasing is preferred over highly
expensive trade credit. Conversely, when the potential for risk shifting
problems is relatively high, firms are not able to fully remedy the
shortage of bank funds by increasing their use of alternative credit
sources. Accordingly, these firms have a significantly lower leverage
ratio. Nevertheless, the earlier documented pecking order with leasing
being preferred over trade credit to remedy a shortage of bank funds
continues to hold in the case of risk shifting incentives.
Third, entrepreneurs who attribute a larger value to private benefits
of control reduce their reliance on bank financing and increase the
maturity of the bank loans that they contract. They make up their
reluctance to borrow from banks by using both leasing and trade
credit, but there is also some weak evidence that these entrepreneurs
prefer to limit leverage at start-up. These results are driven by the
firms whose liquidation value is likely to exceed their going concern
value following default (firms in industries with few firm specific
investments) and by the firms whose suppliers are likely to hold an
important implicit equity stake (firms in high growth and highly
34concentrated industries). These findings are consistent with the argu-
ment that banks adopt a relatively strict liquidation policy for defaulting
firms compared to other creditors, such as suppliers. Due to the
low margins  on  their  loan  transactions,  banks  hold  only  a  small
implicit equity stake in their borrowers. Liability and reputation con-
siderations are likely to reinforce that banks implement liquidation
rights strictly following default. Conversely, suppliers adopt a more
lenient liquidation policy towards their debtors when they hold a large
implicit equity stake in their customers. Then, suppliers attract the
higher risk debtors prevailing in the credit market, inducing them to
set a higher average price for their credit. As a result, when banks
enforce liquidation rights more strictly than suppliers do, high quality
entrepreneurs borrow exclusively from banks at start-up to minimize
their financing expenses. Low quality entrepreneurs with substantial
control rents, on the other hand, limit their bank borrowings to avoid
a potential default against the bank that would result in the liquidation
of their firm.
V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Based on this and earlier research, it can be concluded that personal
financial resources play a crucial role when individuals intend to start
their own business. Also, entrepreneurs typically find it difficult to
access external funds at the time of start-up. The empirical results of
Van Praag and Van Ophem (1995), for instance, show that the majori-
ty of young Americans is willing to switch from labor force partici-
pation to self-employment, but that opportunity – through finance –
is a major constraint. They even conclude from their study that entre-
preneurial ability aspects that can compensate for a lack of capital
are scarce. Similarly, Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994a) and Blanchflower
and Oswald (1998) uncover that the receipt of an inheritance posi-
tively affects an individual’s decision to become an entrepreneur.
The results of this study on the capital structure of business start-ups
also show that entrepreneurs hardly raise external equity at start-up,
except for funds from family and friends, and that banks are reluc-
tant to finance a major fraction of debt when adverse selection and
moral hazard problems are potentially extensive. Furthermore, entre-
preneurs use highly expensive trade credit when constrained by banks
and even have lower leverage when incentive problems are potentially
35extensive. These results hold after controlling for industry factors
affecting the demand for external financing, through the industry MES
and industry dummy variables, and variables that capture the entre-
preneur’s financial wealth. In sum, imperfections in the capital mar-
ket apparently bring about that a lack of personal financial resources
at start-up cannot be offset by contracting additional funds from the
capital  market.  According  to  Holtz-Eakin,  Joulfaian  and  Rosen
(1994b), binding financial constraints at start-up reduce the likelihood
of entrepreneurial survival.
As shown by Birch (1979), Swain (1985), Konings et al. (1998)
and others, newly founded firms may contribute a great deal to job
creation, innovation and economic growth of a country, which is the
reason why governments in a lot of countries financially back entre-
preneurial ventures. The existing public policy measures mainly aim
to reduce the financial constraints of start-ups to increase post-entry
survival. When evaluating economic policy, two important principles
are in order: economic efficiency and fairness. For a given measure
to meet the criterion of economic efficiency, it should meet a given
objective while using as few resources as possible. For a measure to
meet the criterion of fairness, it should be the case that two equally
promising projects obtain the same treatment. In the following sub-
section, I plead for policy measures that stimulate venture capital
financing for smaller scale and non-high tech projects and that encourage
information  production  by  banks.  Thereafter,  I  evaluate  existing
government measures in this context.
A. Suggestions For Government Measures
1. Stimulating Venture Capital for Smaller Scale and Non-High Tech
Projects
Venture capital is an appropriate source of financing for newly founded
enterprises. As the initial cash flows of start-ups are highly uncertain
and potentially negative, the distributions to equity providers are bet-
ter adapted to such patterns of cash flow generation. Furthermore, new
firms face large information and incentive problems at the time of start-
up, which makes screening and monitoring extremely valuable. Ven-
ture capitalists collect substantial information on their portfolio firms,
before and after the contract is established (e.g., Sahlman (1990); Gom-
pers (1995); Lerner (1995)). They simultaneously hold an important
36financial position in multiple firms, which gives them the financial
interest and independence to view a given firm’s management and poli-
cies in an unbiased way. Finally, as the ultimate goal of venture capi-
talists is to sell their portfolio investments, entrepreneurs may value
the call option on control inherent in venture capital financing con-
tracts (see Black and Gilson (1998)). The empirical results of this study
show that control indeed is an important consideration for entrepre-
neurs, which influences their financing decisions at start-up.
The  results  also  show  that  venture  capitalists  are  not  largely
involved in financing the start-up stage of newly established firms in
traditional manufacturing industries. Rather, these start-ups raise sig-
nificant amounts of external debt financing; their median debt ratio
amounts to 78.04%. In addition, 69.75% of the median firm’s total
debt financing matures within one year. It is clear that such a high
debt burden, which also largely consists of short-term debt, makes
default in the first few years after start-up a highly likely event.
Then, premature liquidation of the venture, for instance by banks,
becomes possible. I therefore plead for policy measures that stimulate
venture capital financing for smaller scale and non-high tech projects.
In the past, national authorities in Continental Europe have already
set up some public programs to stimulate venture capital. These pro-
grams were partly motivated by the desire to achieve a threshold volume
of transactions, such that an in-depth venture capital market could
develop. On the one hand, governments have provided venture capi-
tal directly by investing themselves in the industry. However, it is not
a priori clear whether the industry can gain from governments rather
than private investors pumping money into it. It is, for instance, still
an open question whether government funds substitute for or stimu-
late private venture capital. Manigart and Beuselinck (2001), how-
ever, find that the supply of government funds to the venture capital
industry in Continental Europe is inversely related to the overall
economic climate and to the supply of private funds in previous years.
Still, half of the supply of venture capital in Belgium already stems
from the government, though this percentage used to be even higher.
Conversely, in the U.S., 80% of all venture capital flows through inde-
pendent limited partnerships, where pension funds are the largest
contributor of funds, followed by banks and insurance companies
(Berger and Udell (1998)).
Next, I do not believe that just increasing the availability of funds
that  can  be  invested  as  venture  capital  is  the  right  mechanism.
37Rather, a change in focus of venture capitalists has to be brought
about, away from financing merely high tech firms. Several models
argue that institutional investors frequently engage in “herding”, i.e.
making too similar investments (see Devenow and Welch (1996) for
an overview of the literature). While there are positive spillover
effects associated with such a policy, it is also the case that it entails
limited  venture  capital  financing  of  ventures  that  do  not  fit  the
accepted project type. Special tax regimes that encourage the invest-
ment in solid, though not necessarily high tech firms could be help-
ful for this purpose.
Simultaneously,  venture  capitalists’ focus  needs  to  be  shifted
towards smaller scale projects. Gompers (1995), for instance, finds
that the mean venture investment in a U.S. start-up or early stage busi-
ness between 1961 and 1992 was $1.8 million (in 1992 dollars).
However, the substantial size of these investments is largely a conse-
quence of the manner in which venture capital funds are organized.
In particular, the way that venture funds are remunerated encourages
large deal sizes. Venture funds typically receive a substantial share of
their compensation from an annual fee, which amounts to 2 à 3% of
the capital under management. As a result, venture funds prefer to
limit the number of partners that are hired and increase the capital that
each partner manages. Since only a limited number of portfolio invest-
ments can be closely scrutinized, partners prefer to invest in large
scale projects. Compensation schemes therefore should not only con-
sider the amount of funds managed, but also the number of negotiated
deals and – by necessity – their profitability.
Perhaps, the equity stake of venture capitalists in smaller scale, non-
high tech projects will need to be higher in order to make information
collection and strategic support cost effective. However, when venture
capitalists make it clear from the very start that their objectives are
aligned with those of the entrepreneur, i.e. a maximization of firm
value, they may be able overcome the natural resistance of entrepre-
neurs to partly relinquish control in the short run. Given that the largest
firms in the sample are also the ones that raise more external financing
at the time of start-up, this measure may be a cost effective one.5
The bias away from high tech ventures will simultaneously increase
fairness  towards  non-high  tech  start-ups  with  favorable  growth
prospects.
On the other hand, national governments have also used indirect
measures to stimulate venture capital financing, such as constructing
38favorable  fiscal  regimes  for  equity  investments  in  general  (e.g.,
Cooreman-Declerck stimuli during the eighties). For the sake of com-
pleteness, it has to be added that at the level of the Flemish govern-
ment, the idea circulates to grant a special tax treatment of the funds
private investors devote to venture capital. In addition, governments
have encouraged the development of active stock markets for high
growth  companies  (e.g.,  Euro.NM  Belgium  during  the  nineties).
The latter is necessary when, as argued by Black and Gilson (1998),
the possibility of exit through an IPO is important for early stage ven-
ture capital. Measures that stimulate the development of active stock
markets therefore will also increase the dynamics of venture capital
financing. Consider the second half of the nineties as an example.
The upsurge of the stock market during that period has attracted a lot
of new listings, especially of young and high growth firms. As a result,
venture capitalists have attracted larger amounts of financing and have
become more eager to invest at an early stage.
In  addition  to  the  arguments  of  Black  and  Gilson  (1998),
Modigliani and Perotti (2000) find that in countries where property
rights are poorly protected, stock market capitalization relative to
GNP generally is small. Rather, firms are financed by internally gene-
rated cash flows and bank lending. Therefore, they stress a strong
protection of minority rights as a necessary condition for investors to
provide external equity, including venture capital. Minority owners
who feel that majority shareholders do not serve their interests should
have access to legal mechanisms to resist such exploitation. For this,
it is necessary that legislation also considers minority rights in pri-
vate companies. Indeed, previous legislation has mainly focused upon
publicly listed companies through outlining mandatory takeover bid
requirements.
2. Stimulating Information Production by Banks
When venture capital is not available, banks can still play a valuable
function in financing start-ups. Particularly, when ex ante adverse
selection and moral hazard problems are extensive, information pro-
duction before and after the financial contract is established is bene-
ficial. Petersen and Rajan (1994), for instance, find that firms with
highly volatile cash flows and few tangible assets benefit considerably
from close bank ties, especially through the availability of funds.
Simultaneously, banks could also play a certifying role towards other
39financiers, thereby increasing the accessibility of other financing
sources. Diamond (1991), for instance, shows that new borrowers
begin  their  reputation  acquisition  by  being  monitored  by  banks.
Monitored borrowers who behave in the interests of their bank develop
a reputation and new financiers who step in later on can reduce their
monitoring efforts. Therefore, firms may switch to issuing unmoni-
tored financing once they have acquired a reputation.
However, the empirical results show that in industries where infor-
mation and incentive problems are potentially extensive, banks finance
a lower, yet positive fraction of entrepreneurial debt. The smaller size
of these firms, and thus the associated loans, could make screening and
monitoring of new firms cost ineffective for banks, especially since
their compensation is asymmetrically related to actual performance.
One way to solve this problem could be to allow banks to provide
financing through equity or debt instruments that can be converted
into equity. The current restrictions banks face on equity investments
(see Section III), however, have their own merits. Most countries have
installed mechanisms to insure private investors’deposits against bank
failures (e.g., Depositogarantiesysteem in Belgium, FDIC in U.S.);
when banks are allowed to invest in instruments with an equity-like
feature, bank shareholders, holding a call option on the assets of the
bank, will prefer that banks leverage their asset portfolio towards more
risky investments, at the cost of depositors and thus society. Further-
more, there are other ways banks can deal with such restrictions with-
out largely increasing the risk of their own assets. Banks can for
instance establish independent subsidiaries that specialise in venture
capital; the main conclusions of Section V.A. continue to hold for
these subsidiaries.
Another way to stimulate bank information production could be to
reduce the costs of these activities rather than increase the payoffs.
When banks are allowed to deduct its costs in their income statement
at an amount that is somewhat higher than the actual costs incurred,
they may invest more in collecting information. This measure could
also be tuned to recently established firms in order to specifically
encourage bank information production for this category of firms.
I would like to refer here to the example of Austria, where the go-
vernment allows firms to deduct 125% of actual R&D expenses from
their taxable basis to stimulate R&D investments.
Next, the current bank liability regulation also discourages bank
information production because banks may have limited incentives to
40act upon the information that they have collected. In particular, once
a firm defaults on its bank debt, control is turned to its bank, who has
to  decide  whether  the  firm  should  be  liquidated  or  whether  the
defaulted claims can be reorganized. When it is not unambiguously
clear that the firm will be able to recover, the bank has an incentive
to liquidate. For if it decides to reorganize and the firm eventually
goes bankrupt, third parties, such as suppliers, can file a suit against
the bank for having granted/renegotiated credit undeservedly, thereby
having given a too positive signal on the firm’s quality. It is obvious
that such regulation is likely to bias the bank’s liquidation policy
towards excessive liquidation. Then, information production may no
longer be warranted since a firm that defaults is likely to be liquidated
anyway. Therefore, I plead for imposing more strict criteria under
which banks can be held liable by other creditors when a firm with
bank debt outstanding goes bankrupt.
B. Existing Government Measures: a Critical Evaluation6
In this section, only government measures that specifically address
financial support for start-up firms are considered. Instruments to
support educational training, special infrastructure, exports, invest-
ments in R&D, etc. also exist, but these measures can be used by
non-starters too. Most governmental actions of financial support cen-
ter upon reducing the equity gap for start-up firms. Furthermore,
these actions are provided mainly by the regional governments.
For Flemish business start-ups, the Flemish government provides
loans and guarantees through its Participation Fund. In this section,
I briefly discuss and evaluate these measures, based on the above
discussion.
1. The Starter’s and Start-up Loan
The starter’s loan is a junior loan of € 27,268.29 (BEF 1,100,000)
accorded to a fully entitled unemployed person, who wishes to become
self-employed or establish an own company. The entrepreneur has to
invest an amount of at least one fourth of the requested funds. The loan
does not require any security, has a maturity of 13 years and a limited
interest rate (3% during the first five years; 5% thereafter). Also, the
loan has a three year grace period, during which principal payments
can be deferred.
41The start-up loan is intended to finance investments in working
capital and tangible and intangible assets. It can be obtained by 
self-employed people, free professionals and SMEs. The principal of
the loan is limited to three times the personal investment of the
entrepreneur and should not exceed € 123,946.76 (BEF 5,000,000).
The government does not require any security. A temporary exemp-
tion of principal repayments is possible. The maturity of the loan
depends upon the investment project and should not exceed that of
the main loan accorded by a bank, with an absolute maximum of
20 years. The interest rate is limited to 3% during an initial period
depending upon the maturity date of the loan. The market interest
rate applies thereafter.
Both categories of loans can help to reduce financial constraints.
Furthermore, the starter’s loan does not reduce the entrepreneur’s bar-
gaining position when raising other debt sources because of its sub-
ordinated nature. These features are highly beneficial for start-ups in
industries where adverse selection and moral hazard problems are
potentially extensive as previous empirical results suggest that espe-
cially these firms may lack the necessary funds. However, the starter’s
and start-up loan are typical examples of public policy measures that
are mainly concerned with the number of new firms and the rate of
new firm foundation. From an efficiency point of view, this is a serious
disadvantage.  The  government  should  not  just  strive  to  increase
the availability of financing as such. Rather, the problem is that some
firms find it difficult to obtain external financing because of venture
capitalists’ and banks’ financing policies. Therefore, the government
should mainly grant loans to ventures with large financing needs and
that find it difficult to obtain private funding. Simultaneously, the prin-
cipal of these loans should depend upon the firm’s true financing
needs. Next, these government loans do not induce private institutions
to actually collect information on the firm. As a result, good behavior
cannot be rewarded by granting additional or cheaper funding. Finally,
public policy should also aim to discourage individuals who are clearly
unsuitable for entrepreneurship to start up their own business (see also
Storey and Johnson (1987)). However, the above loans are accorded
without collecting any information on the viability and quality of the
project. In order for government loans to be warranted on the basis of
efficiency, it is necessary that the government can better identify firms
where investments lead to high social and/or private returns than pri-
vate investors can.
422. Guaranteeing Bank Loans
This measure intends to meet the needs of starting entrepreneurs who
encounter difficulties in obtaining a professional (bank) loan because
of a lack of personal or business collateral. The guarantee can only
be obtained  for  loans  to  finance  investments  in  tangible  assets.
Once granted, the guarantee remains valid during a seven year period.
The guarantee can only be partial and is limited to 50% of the loan’s
principal, with a maximum of €37,184.03 (BEF 1,500,000). The entre-
preneur needs to satisfy certain conditions, such as being qualified for
the planned profession. Furthermore, the entrepreneur has to submit a
financial plan with the bank. The principal of the underlying loan is
limited to € 123,946.76 (BEF 5,000,000) and its maturity to 15 years.
The grace period of the loan should not exceed one year. Personal
guarantees by the entrepreneur or third parties should be restricted to
one fourth of the granted loan. The entrepreneur has to pay a premium
for the guarantee, which is determined at 2% of the guaranteed amount
with a maximum of € 743.68 (BEF 30,000).
A positive effect of these guarantees is that they can help to reduce
financial constraints by increasing the readiness of banks to grant loans
at a cheaper price. Their main shortcoming is that banks may actually
be induced to reduce their information collection on newly established
firms. As a result, providing guarantees is likely to increase the availa-
bility of financing for both high and low quality ventures. Further-
more, guarantees may prevent banks from closely monitoring firms ex
post, which could reduce their incentives to lend additional funds to
further finance valuable projects. Finally, the concerns raised in Sec-
tion V.B.1. also apply here.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this article, I discuss policy implications based on a study of the
capital structure of business start-ups. Using a sample of 328 newly
founded enterprises in Belgian manufacturing, it turned out that ven-
ture capital is barely used as a source of financing at the time of start-
up. For the large majority of start-ups, only bank debt and trade credit
are available. The existing literature supports the idea that banks moni-
tor  their  debtors  (e.g.,  James  (1987);  Diamond  (1991)),  whereas
suppliers may lack the expertise and/or incentives to monitor their
43customers. Therefore, the information production role of banks is
important, but in contrast with the literature on established, listed
firms, banks finance a lower fraction of debt for firms that face poten-
tially large adverse selection and moral hazard problems at start-up.
Start-up firms then use leasing and vendor financing to remedy the
shortage of bank credit, but have lower leverage when risk shifting
problems are potentially extensive. These results suggest that newly
founded enterprises may face significant financial constraints at start-
up, which could contribute to their subsequent failure.
As a result, I plead for policy measures that stimulate venture capi-
tal financing for smaller scale and non-high tech projects. Up till now,
public policy towards entrepreneurship has focused on the availability
of venture capital for growth oriented entrepreneurial firms, con-
centrating on innovation and change. However, the Belgian experience
proves  that  a  significant  fraction  of  start-ups  are  smaller  scale
enterprises with a focus on subsistence. Next, I stress the need of
encouraging banks, who have developed expertise in assessing and
managing credit risk, to collect information on entrepreneurial quality
and  incentive  problems.  While  having  their  own  merits,  current
government measures towards start-ups, which largely consist of
providing and guaranteeing loans, do not meet these requirements.
Overall,  current  policy  measures  are  too  much  oriented  towards
increasing the availability of financing for start-ups, independent of
their quality and financing needs.
NOTES
1. Legally, suppliers cannot vary trade credit terms to the quality of their customers. Sup-
pliers therefore cannot act upon the information they have collected, which reduces
the incentive to actually gather information. Furthermore, trade credit is short-term
debt, which by its nature is less sensitive to actions that decrease the value of debthold-
ers’claims. Not surprisingly, the empirical evidence shows that suppliers follow indus-
try standards when deciding on trade credit terms (Ng, Smith and Smith (1999)).
2. This low percentage could also indicate that the total size of the venture capital financing
pool is limited, such that venture capitalists can pick out the most promising ventures.
The existing empirical evidence does not support one interpretation over another.
While Manigart and Beuselinck (2001) show that the amount of funds invested by the
private sector in venture capital depends on previous stock market returns, which sup-
ports the latter interpretation, Sahlman (1990) finds that in spite of all screening, still
one third of approved dossiers turns into losses for venture capitalists, which supports
the former interpretation.
3. An alternative exit route could be for entrepreneurs to buy out the venture capitalist, for
instance, by leveraging their company in a management buyout. However, for rapidly
growing firms that still consume a lot of funds, this alternative is not a feasible one.
444. Increased competition in the banking sector since the 1980s has been attributed to
increased desintermediation, internationalization, changing customer preferences,
and deregulation,  which  led  to  excess  capacity  for  banks  (e.g.,  Remolona  and
Wulfekuhler (1992), Benink and Llewellyn (1994)).
5. The correlation between firm size (log of total assets) and leverage is ρ = 0.4644;
the associated p-value is 0.0001.
6. The information regarding existing government measures is correct, to the best of my
knowledge, at the time this article is written.
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